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The	  Brazilian	  commercial	  aircra/	  manufacturer,	  Embraer,	  
maintains	  a	  compe88ve	  posi8on	  in	  the	  global	  market	  
despite	  Brazil’s	  low	  capital-­‐stock	  and	  paucity	  of	  high-­‐
technology	  exports.	  Tradi8onal	  no8ons	  of	  compara8ve	  
advantage	  contend	  that	  the	  commercial	  aircra/	  market	  
should	  be	  the	  exclusive	  domain	  of	  highly	  developed	  na8ons	  
(e.g.	  USA,	  EU,	  Canada).	  
An	  inves8ga8on	  into	  the	  company	  reveals	  a	  long	  history	  of	  
government	  largesse.	  The	  support	  provided	  was	  cri8cal	  to	  
the	  company’s	  success	  as	  it	  aﬀorded	  Embraer	  access	  to	  
innova8ve	  technology	  and	  lucra8ve	  contracts.	  In	  par8cular,	  
the	  Brazilian	  government’s	  Programa	  de	  EsLmulo	  ås	  
Exportações	  (PROEX)	  vaulted	  the	  company	  to	  global	  success	  
in	  the	  1990’s	  
PROEX	  was	  not	  without	  its	  costs	  however,	  as	  the	  subsidy	  
program	  embroiled	  Brazil	  and	  Canada	  in	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
heated	  WTO	  disputes	  to	  date.	  
	  
Method	  
The	  body	  of	  work	  known	  as	  the	  “strategic	  trade	  literature”	  was	  developed	  
during	  the	  1980’s	  to	  analyze	  the	  poten8al	  gains	  from	  subsidizing	  a	  domes8c	  ﬁrm	  
that	  competes	  in	  an	  imperfectly	  compe88ve	  market	  [1].	  The	  most	  inﬂuen8al	  
model	  of	  strategic	  trade	  was	  described	  by	  Brander	  and	  Spencer	  in	  their	  1985	  
paper.	  Their	  model	  demonstrated	  how	  export	  subsidiza8on	  could	  help	  a	  
domes8c	  ﬁrm	  capture	  super-­‐normal	  proﬁts.	  
	  
Though	  widely	  regarded	  as	  inﬂuen8al,	  the	  Brander	  and	  Spencer	  model	  fails	  to	  
take	  into	  account	  the	  reac8on	  of	  foreign	  governments	  and	  therefore	  is	  not	  
regarded	  as	  sound	  policy	  advice.	  Rather,	  an	  agreement	  to	  limit	  subsidies	  has	  
been	  proven	  to	  be	  jointly	  welfare	  improving.	  From	  a	  poli8cal-­‐economy	  
standpoint,	  Marc	  Busch’s	  Trade	  Warriors	  is	  very	  eﬀec8ve	  at	  proving	  this.	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  last	  so	  long	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nature	  of	  the	  countries’	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Can	  the	  jointly-­‐subop8mal	  nature	  of	  the	  subsidy	  program	  be	  
simulated	  using	  strategic	  trade	  models?	  
“Beggar	  Thy	  Neighbor”	  Prisoner’s	  Dilemma	  [2]	  
Future	  Research	  
My	  advisor	  and	  I	  are	  s8ll	  in	  the	  process	  of	  simula8ng	  the	  
impact	  of	  Brazil	  and	  Canada’s	  subsidies.	  Using	  a	  model	  
developed	  by	  Dr.	  Sheldon	  in	  a	  paper	  simula8ng	  
environmental	  policy	  and	  the	  aluminum	  industry,	  we	  hope	  
to	  demonstrate	  that	  an	  agreement	  to	  limit	  subsidies	  would	  
be	  jointly	  welfare-­‐increasing.	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Though	  Marc	  Busch’s	  depic8on	  of	  a	  similar	  commercial	  
aircra/	  dispute	  (Airbus	  v	  Boeing)	  highlights	  that	  an	  
agreement	  to	  limit	  subsidies	  is	  jointly	  welfare	  increasing,	  
the	  Brazil	  vs.	  Canada	  dispute	  dragged	  on	  for	  years.	  
Andrea	  Goldstein	  and	  Steven	  McGuire	  point	  to	  a	  set	  of	  
ideas	  and	  interests	  within	  each	  country’s	  government	  that	  
raised	  the	  stakes	  of	  the	  WTO	  dispute	  and	  lowered	  the	  
possibility	  of	  an	  amicable	  resolu8on.	  [3]	  
